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Rethinking Merger Efficiencies

Daniel A. Crane*

Merger law exhibits an unexplained and unexamined
differentiation between probabilistic costs and benefits. 1 In the two
leading merger systems—those of United States and the European
Union—merger law implicitly requires a greater degree of predictive
proof of merger-generated efficiencies than it does of mergergenerated social costs. As a matter of both verbal formulation in the
governing legal norms and observed practice of antitrust enforcement
agencies and courts, the government is accorded greater evidentiary
leniency in proving anticompetitive effects than the merging parties
are in proving offsetting efficiencies.

* Professor of Law, University of Michigan. Earlier drafts of this paper were
presented at workshops at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology/University of
Zurich, the University of East Anglia, and the University of Michigan. This paper
grew out of a joint submission to the Justice Department and Federal Trade
Commission with Joe Simons. All mistakes are, of course, my own.
1
The voluminous academic literature on merger efficiencies includes Jamie
Henikoff Moffitt, Merging in the Shadow of the Law: The Case for Consistent
Judicial Efficiency Analysis, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 1697 (2010); An Renckens, Welfare
Standards, Substantive Tests, and Efficiency Considerations in Merger Policy:
Defining the Efficiency Defense, 3 J. Comp. L & Econ. 149 (2007); Robert
Pitofsky, Efficiency Consideration and Merger Enforcement: Comparison of U.S.
and EU Approaches, 30 Fordham Int’l L.J. 1413 (2007); Malcolm B. Coate,
Efficiencies in Merger Analysis: An Institutionalist View, 13 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev.
189 (2005); William J. Kolasky & Andrew R. Dick, The Merger Guidelines and
the Integration of Efficiencies into Antitrust Review of Horizontal Mergers, 71
Antitrust L. J. 207 (2003); Robert Pitofsky, 7 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 485 (1999);
Timothy J. Muris, The Government and Merger Efficiencies: Still Hostile After All
These Years, 7 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 729 (1999); Gregory J. Werden, An Economic
Perspective on the Analysis of Merger Efficiencies, 11-SUM Antitrust 12 (1997);
Mark N. Berry, Efficiencies and Horizontal Mergers: In Search of a Defense, 33
San Diego L. Rev. 515 (1996); Joseph Kattan, Efficiencies and Merger Analysis, 62
Antitrust L. J. 513 (1994); Alan A. Fisher & Robert H. Lande, Efficiency
Considerations in Merger Enforcement, 71 Cal. L. Rev. 1580 (1983); Jackson, The
Consideration of Economies in Merger Cases, 43 J. Bus. 439 (1970).
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To illustrate, suppose that the best available economic evidence
holds that a horizontal merger is 40% likely to create $100 in net
present value consumer welfare losses and 40% likely to create $100
in net present value efficiencies that would be passed on to
consumers. 2 Putting aside enforcement costs, the expected value of
the merger to consumers is zero. Therefore, all else being equal,
there is no reason to challenge the merger, particularly given
enforcement costs, which are high. Under prevailing norms and
practices, however, the merger would likely be challenged.
Superficially, at least, the articulated legal mechanism for this
differentiation would be a difference in the standards of proof for the
government’s affirmative case and the defendant’s rebuttal case.
The systemic consequences of this asymmetry are significant, in a
way that has not previously been appreciated. Superficially, it might
appear that the only consequence of a more stringent approach to
claims of merger efficiencies is that some mergers that are close calls
on the anticompetitive effects side of the ledger will be prohibited
even though, on balance, they might actually benefit to society.
Since merger policy has been relatively lenient overall in the past
three decades, false positives in a handful of close-call merger cases
might seem a relatively trivial consequence of an unexplained
evidentiary asymmetry. But this view incorrectly assumes that the
only consequence of stringency on proof of efficiencies falls on the
efficiencies side of the ledger. There are good reasons to think that
this is not true—that courts and agencies selectively compensate for
not giving much weight to merger efficiencies claims by demanding
too much proof of anticompetitive effects from government antitrust
enforcers. In an alternative legal regime where efficiencies and risks
were equally weighted and parties therefore had a greater incentive to
come forward with evidence of efficiencies, some mergers that today
proceed unchallenged might very well be challenged since courts and
enforcers might become more credulous of anticompetitive effects
theories in cases without plausible efficiencies claims. Rebalancing
the weighting of efficiencies and anticompetitive effects might have a

2

The efficiencies and harms of mergers are almost always something to be
predicted, because most jurisdictions that prohibit anticompetitive mergers,
including the US and the EU, require premerger notification and clearance of most
categories of potentially troubling mergers. Hence, the merger review function
occurs before actual harms or efficiencies are known. See infra text accompanying
notes xxx – xxx.
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significant effect on the overall mix and distribution of merger
challenges.
This Article interrogates the differential treatment of costs and
benefits and argues that it is unjustified and counterproductive. A
potential merger efficiency should be given equal weight to an
equally likely anticompetitive risk of the same magnitude. To put it
more formally, the probability-adjusted net present value of merger
risks should be treated symmetrically with the probability-adjusted
net present value of merger efficiencies.
The proposition just advanced might seem intuitively obvious
given ordinary cost-benefit analysis principles, but there are a
number of reasons why symmetrical weighting might not hold in the
merger context. Merger efficiencies might be disfavored because
they tend to be captured by producers rather than consumers, even
while the consumers bear the full weight of anticompetitive effects.
They might be disfavored because short-run efficiencies can create
long-run market dominance that create further inefficiencies as the
merging firms eventually exercise market power. They might be
disfavored because, unlike anticompetitive effects theories,
efficiencies theories are inherently speculative.
Relatedly,
efficiencies claims may be suspect because of a general view that
large corporate mergers are more often the product of kingdombuilding by imperialistic CEOs than efforts to generate shareholder
value or that managers proposing mergers suffer, as a class, from
optimism bias.
Merger efficiencies may also be running up against the
expression of political or ideological values in merger policy.
Efficiency doctrine and practice may express residual manifestations
of the precautionary principle, which holds that the proponents of
economic changes that may pose risks to social welfare bear a high
burden of ruling out the risks before the change should be allowed.
Or, the veiled antipathy to merger efficiencies may be a holding place
for ideological resistance to large aggregations of economic power,
even when those aggregations advance short-run consumer interests.
This Article interrogates and normatively rejects each of these
possible justifications for cost/benefit asymmetry. It argues in favor
of a formal principle of symmetrical treatment of expected costs and
benefits from future mergers. However, treating costs and benefits
symmetrically does not necessarily entail a comprehensive overhaul
in the way that merger efficiencies are considered or the weight they
are given in merger review. Courts and agencies sometimes discount
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certain efficiency claims for justifiable reasons. Some efficiency
claims are inherently speculative or unlikely to advance consumer
welfare. Rather, adoption of the symmetry principle would add rigor
and transparency to merger review and reveal circumstances where
well-founded efficiency defenses may be subordinated to confused
analysis or weakly articulated policy objections.
Part I of this Article sets the stage by describing the prospective
context of merger review decisions, which require agencies and
sometimes courts to make predictive assessments of the
consequences of mergers that have not yet occurred. It then
describes the asymmetrical treatment between merger costs and
benefits as a positive matter in the law and practice of U.S. and
European antitrust agencies and courts. Although these two leading
and often competing merger control jurisdictions differ in many ways
on the substance and institutional framework of merger review, they
share a common and unexplained devaluation of merger efficiencies
as compared to their treatment of predicted anticompetitive merger
costs.
Part II analyzes the systemic consequences of the understood
norm of agency and court discounting of merger efficiency
arguments. While this phenomenon has generally been understood
just to stand in the way of some mergers potentially beneficial to
society, the asymmetry principle may in fact result in an overall
suboptimal mix of approved and disapproved mergers, since the
principle tends to create a suboptimal amount of information that
would be useful in judging both predictive efficiencies and
anticompetitive effects.
Part III identifies a number of possible justifications for
asymmetrical treatment and rejects each one as normatively
insufficient to justify a principle of asymmetry.
Finally, Part IV proposes a path forward for more fluid
integration of efficiency concerns in merger review. It considers the
role that burdens of proof should play on efficiencies questions. It
also acknowledges that a principle of symmetrical treatment cannot
be applied in a numerically rigid way but rather serves as mnemonic
device to stimulate a rebalancing in some key drivers of merger
policy. Finally, it considers the additional complexity costs that a
symmetry principle might entail.
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I. MERGER EFFICIENCIES’ LEGAL MALAISE
A. The Predictive Context of Merger Decisions
Unlike adjudicatory decision-making, which usually involves
reconstructing past facts and sorting through their legal implications,
regulatory decision-making inherently involves predictions about the
future. 3 When the FDA decides whether to allow the marketing of a
new drug, the EPA decides whether to allow a new pesticide, or the
Highway Transportation Safety Board decides on rules for new
automobile safety features, the agencies must make predictions about
the respective costs and benefits of the innovations. 4 Still, even in
these regulatory contexts where future paths and not past conduct is
in question, the agencies usually can base their decisions on a
sampling of information reflecting the innovation’s properties. The
FDA can review clinical trials, 5 the EPA can order testing of the
pesticides, 6 and the Highway Transportation Safety Board can
simulate the robustness of the safety devices in crash tests. 7 The
predictions are thus extrapolations from controlled experiments to
real world interactions.
By contrast, most modern merger review requires predictions
about the likely consequences of an event that has not yet occurred
and which it is not possible to sample, study, or test. With few
exceptions, merger challenges occur before mergers have closed. In
the United States, this is due to the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act of 1976,
which requires parties making stock or asset acquisitions that meet
certain dollar thresholds to file a premerger notification document

3

See generally Michael Abramowicz, Predictive Decsionmaking, 92 Va. L. Rev.
69 (2006).
4
See generally Richard L. Revesz & Michael A. Livermore, Retaking Rationality:
How Cost-Benefit Analysis Can Better Protect the Environment and our Health
(2008).
5
U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Running Clinical Trials,
http://www.fda.gov/ScienceResearch/SpecialTopics/RunningClinicalTrials/default.
htm (explaining regulatory framework for running clinical trials).
6
See generally 7 U.S.C. § 136 (2006) (codifying EPA’s regulatory authority over
pesticides).
7
Updated Review of Potential Test Procedures for FMVSS
No. 208,
http://www.nhtsa.gov/DOT/NHTSA/NRD/Multimedia/PDFs/Crashworthiness/Air
%20Bags/FMVSS_208_II.pdf.
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with both the U.S. antitrust enforcement agencies. 8 The parties may
not close the merger transaction until thirty days after filing the
premerger notification. 9 If prior to the close of the thirty days
whichever agency is handling the case has concerns about the
transaction, it can file a dreaded “second request” for information. 10
The parties are then prohibited to close the merger until certifying
substantial completion of the second request, 11 a process which can
take upwards of six months. 12 Because most mergers are time
sensitive, parties have strong incentives to seek resolution with the
agencies by restructuring their deals to assuage any competitive
concerns or else to abandon the deals rather than to litigate. 13
The European Union follows an even stricter premerger clearance
system. Subject to various exceptions, parties to a merger must file a
premerger notification form and await a final decision by the
European Commission before closing the transaction. 14 The review
can take up to 105 days. 15 If the Commission chooses to prohibit a
merger, the parties must then seek annulment of the Commission
decision in the European General Court, a process than take over a
year even on a “fast track.” 16 As in the U.S., most firms abandon or
8

15 U.S.C. § 18a.
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
See Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42
U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1375, 1462 n.382 (2009) (collecting various estimates on time
and expense to comply with second request).
13
Joe Sims & Deborah P. Herman, The Effect of Twenty Years of Hart-ScottRodino on Merger Practice: A Case Study in the Law of Unintended Consequences
Applied to Antitrust Legislation, 65 Antitrust L.J. 865, 881 (1997) (noting that the
FTC and DOJ have “essentially create[d] the automatic stay of a transaction that
the 94th Congress explicitly refused to grant”); see also Edward T. Swaine,
“Competition, Not Competitors,” Nor Canards: Ways of Criticizing the
Commission, 23 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 597, 632 (2002) (arguing that “American
companies might be slow to characterize the HSR process as one susceptible to
judicial oversight” because “[v]oluminous Second Requests” act as “de facto
injunctions”).
14
ELEANOR M. FOX & DANIEL A. CRANE, GLOBAL ISSUES IN ANTITRUST AND
COMPETITION LAW 451 (2010).
15
EU Competition Law: Rules Applicable to Merger Control (1 April 2010),
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/merger_compilation.pdf.
16
John Davies & Robert Schlossberg, Once More Unto the Breach Dear Friends”:
Judicial Review of Antitrust Agency Merger Clearance Decisions, 21 Antitrust 17,
21-22 (2006) (describing the European “fast-track” judicial review procedure
9
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restructure deals that the Commission challenges rather than
choosing to litigate. 17
Further, antitrust principles prohibit “gun jumping,” that is to say
any pre-closing integration or coordination of the firms on such
matters as price and output. 18 The upshot is that, in the horizontal
cases which are by far the largest set of merger cases, 19 the firms
must continue to behave as arms-length competitors during the time
period during which the potential anticompetitive effects of their
proposed merger are under evaluation. Thus, on neither the
predictive anticompetitive effects side nor on the predictive
efficiencies side do the agencies have sample data from which they
can extrapolate results before they must make their decision.
In evaluating likely anticompetitive effects, the agencies
generally consider one of two kinds of theories. In homogenous
goods markets, they consider the possibility that the merger will
increase concentration to the point that tacit or explicit collusion
(such as price fixing or market division) among the remaining firms
in the market will be facilitated. 20 These “coordinated interaction”
theories tend to depend heavily on structural assumptions—for
example, that concentration levels above a certain Herfindahl
Hirschman Index (“HHI”) in markets characterized by certain
features (for example, high fungibility of goods, transparency of

which can take seven to nineteen months as compared to an average of thirty-one
months in for cases not on a fast track); Stephanie Bodoni, EU Judge Vesterdorf
Backs New Antitrust Court to Speed Up Cases, Bloomberg.com, Oct. 24, 2006,
http://
www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601085&sid=afPmsLOj93rQ&refer=euro
pe (noting that judicial review of Commission decisions in merger cases takes on
average nine and eleven months).
17
The European Commission rarely reaches a prohibition decision in merger cases
since most questionable mergers are resolved by the merging parties making
“commitments” that resolve any competitive concerns. The Commission’s
statistics show that the Commission only reached 21 prohibition decisions over the
20-year
period
from
1990
to
2010.
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/statistics.pdf.
In the same period, it
allowed 93 mergers with “commitments.”
18
See Kathryn M. Fenton & Erin M. Fishman, M&A Transaction Planning:
Premerger Coordination, Gun Jumping, and Other Related Issues, 1565 PLI/Corp
245 (2006).
19
HMG § 7; see generally Andrew R. Dick, Coordinated Interaction: Pre-Merger
Constraints and Post-Merger Effects, 12 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 65 (2003).
20
HMG § 7.
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pricing, entry barriers, strong mechanisms for detecting price cutting,
and a history of past collusion) tend to result in increased
opportunities to collude. 21
In differentiated goods markets, collusion is far less likely to
result even with increases in concentration and the agencies tend to
focus on the possibility that the merger will allow the merging parties
to increase price or reduce quality even without tacit or explicit
collusion. 22 In these cases, the agencies apply a “unilateral effects”
theory to determine whether the merged firms would be able to
increase prices or decrease quality even without cooperation by the
other firms in the market. 23 The key factor in such an analysis is
whether consumers consider the products sold by the merging parties
to be each other’s best substitutes—meaning that customers tend to
substitute preferentially between the goods or services of the merging
parties. 24 Critical to these types of analyses are the diversion ratios
between the two firms’ products. 25 The agencies also pay close
attention to the possibility of price discrimination against vulnerable
populations of customers which a merger may facilitate even if it
does not permit price increases to the market as a whole. 26
The sources of information that the agencies consider in
deploying coordinated interaction and unilateral effects models vary
by the type of case. Increasingly, the agencies place priority on
experience with similar cases. 27 Where the necessary market share
and demand elasticity data are available, economists in the agencies
run merger simulations to estimate the price effects resulting from the
merger. 28
21

Id.
HMG § 6. See generally David Scheffman & Joseph Simons, Unilateral Effects
for Differentiated Products: Theory, Assumptions, and Research, 9-APR Antitrust
Source 1 (2010).
23
HMG § 6.1.
24
Id.
25
Id. A diversion ratio is “the fraction of unit sales lost by the first product due to
an increase in its price that would be diverted to the second product.” Id.
26
HMG § 3.
27
HMG § 2.1.2.
28
See Kai Hüschelrath, Detection of Anticompetitive Horizontal Mergers, 5 J.
Comp. L. & Econ. 683, 694 (2009); Roy Epstein & Daniel Rubinfeld, Merger
Simulation: A Simplified Approach with New Applications, 6 Antitrust L.J. 883
(2001); Philip Crooke, Luke Froeb, Steven Tschantz & Gregory Werden, Effects of
Assumed Demand Form on Simulated Postmerger Equilibria, 15 Rev. Indus. Org.
205 (1999).
22
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Only about five percent of all mergers scrutinized by the antitrust
agencies in the U.S. and the EU give rise to competitive concerns. 29
Weighing against these concerns of anticompetitive effects are
potential economies from the merger.
Generically, merger
efficiencies can include economies of scale or scope, technological
complementarity, reduction in transportation or other distribution
costs, reduced capital costs, product line specialization, deployment
of scarce managerial talent across a wider portfolio of assets, and
positive innovation effects due to the combination of research and
development laboratories or intellectual property portfolios. 30 To a
large extent, predictions about these efficiencies depends less on
models and more on fact-specific data than is true on the
anticompetitive effects side of the ledger.
The upshot is that merger control is an inherently predictive
exercise. While the quality of available models and data concerning
proposed mergers varies by issue, merger law is inherently about
diving future industrial paths in light of the exogenous shock of firm
integration. It is for this reason that probability principles play such
an important role in steering the contours of merger review.
B. U.S. Legal Principles
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as modified by the 1950 CellerKefauver Amendments, forms the substantive bedrock of U.S.
merger policy.
Its terse text, prohibiting mergers and asset
acquisitions whose effect “may be substantially to lessen
competition” 31 makes no reference either to a threshold of probability
for a finding of anticompetitive effects nor to any possibility of an
efficiencies defense.
In explicating the text of Section 7, the Supreme Court has read
the word “may” as providing some indication of the threshold of
proof necessary for a finding that a merger is predictively
anticompetitive. In oft-repeated dictum from its 1962 Brown Shoe
opinion, the Court observed: “Congress used the words ‘may be
substantially to lessen competition’ (emphasis supplied, to indicate
29

Pitofsky, Efficiency Consideration, supra n. xxx at 1413.
PATRICK A. GAUGHAN, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND CORPORATE
RESTRUCTURINGS 117-68 (2d ed. 2007) (outlining motivations for mergers and
acquisitions); Fisher & Lande, supra n. xxx at 1599.
31
15 U.S.C. § 18.
30
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that its concern was with probabilities, not certainties.” 32 Reflecting
on Celler-Kefauver’s legislative history, the Court observed that
“[s]tatutes existed for dealing with clear-cut menaces to competition;
no statute was sought for dealing with ephemeral possibilities,”33
thus suggesting that the threshold of necessary probability lies
somewhere between the “clear-cut” and the “ephemeral.” Summing
up the threshold of probability question, the Court observed:
“Mergers with a probable anticompetitive effect were to be
proscribed by this Act.” 34
The elliptical use of “probable” evokes a commonly used, if not
precisely defined, threshold in the hierarchy of American legal
probability—probable cause, which is the quantum of probability
necessary for the issuance of a search warrant under the Fourth
Amendment. The Supreme Court has denied that probable cause is
susceptible of “precise definition or quantification into
percentages,” 35 but practitioners and commentators often understand
it to lie in the 40-45% range. 36 A survey of federal judges found an
average percentage of 46% for probable cause. 37 In any event, the
Supreme Court’s repeated invocation of “probability” as the relevant
threshold of proof for merger harms suggests that the Government’s
burden in seeking to enjoin a merger is less than a preponderance of
the evidence.
Complicating this assessment is the fact that most litigated
merger proceedings (of which there are very few since most merger
cases are resolved within the agencies) 38 are decided on preliminary
injunctions rather than trials on the merits.39 In typical preliminary
injunction proceedings, the plaintiff needs to establish a “substantial
32

Brown Shoe Co. v. U.S., 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962).
Id.
34
Id.
35
Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003).
36
See, e.g., Lawrence Rosenthal, The Crime Drop and the Fourth Amendment:
Toward and Empirical Jurisprudence of Search and Seizure, 29 NYU Rev. L. &
Soc. Change, 641, 680 (2005) (reporting that a newly minted Assistant United
States Attorney was informed by his supervisor that probable cause meant 40%).
37
C.M.A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof: Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence, or
Constitutional Guarantees?, 35 Vand. L. Rev. 1293, 1325 (1982).
38
See infra text accompanying notes xxx – xxx.
39
See Moffitt, supra n. xxx at 1710 (analyzing preliminary injunction decisions
from past twenty-five years).
33
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likelihood of success on the merits,” a threshold higher than probable
cause and probably higher than a preponderance of the evidence. 40
But since the ultimate standard of proof is probability, not
preponderance, the government’s effective burden is merely to prove
a “substantial likelihood” that it will eventually be able to show
probable cause to block the merger—a combination that seems to
make the Government’s burden shrink arithmetically. Further, when
the Federal Trade Commission sues for a preliminary injunction to
block a merger so that it may conduct a full administrative review of
the merger, courts have held that the FTC need only raise “serious,
substantial, difficult, and doubtful” issues about the merger. 41 This
seems to collapse the necessary threshold of probability on
anticompetitive effects even further.
This bias in favor of harms over efficiencies is reflected in the
text of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines (which were substantially
overhauled in 2010). The Guidelines implicitly treat the efficiencies
and the anticompetitive risks asymmetrically by insisting that
efficiencies be proven to a very high degree of certainty in order to
justify a merger whereas risks need not be proven with great certainty
in order to block a merger. 42 In order to find anticompetitive effects,
the Guidelines require only “reliable” evidence about the “likely
effects of a merger.” 43 On the other hand, the guidelines project an
attitude of suspicion at the least, and hostility at the most, toward
efficiencies claims. They note that “[e]ficiencies are difficult to
verify and quantify, in part because much of the information relating
to efficiencies is uniquely in the possession of the merging firms.

40

See, e.g., U.S. v. Melrose East Subdivision, 357 F.3d 493 (5th Cir. 2004)
(observing that a substantial likelihood of success on the merits is presumably a
higher standard than probable cause).
41
FTC v. Whole Foods, Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
42
The same held under the recently-replaced 1992 Guidelines. Thus, for example,
Section 1 of the 1992 Guidelines explained that the overall analysis is focused on
whether firms “likely would” take certain actions given their economic interests.
There was no requirement of a verification that the firms actually would raise
prices post merger, just that doing so would be consistent with a rational actor
model. On the other hand, Section 4 sternly warned that efficiencies defenses are
not to made lightly. Efficiencies can’t just be predicted; they must be verified
through empirical evidence. When potential adverse competitive effects are
expected to be “large,” verified efficiencies must be “extraordinarily great.”
43
HMG § 2.2.1.
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Moreover, efficiencies projected reasonably and in good faith by the
merging firms may not be realized. Therefore, it is incumbent upon
the merging firms to substantiate efficiency claims so that the
Agencies can verify by reasonable means the likelihood and
magnitude of each asserted efficiency, how and when each would be
achieved (and any costs of doing so), how each would enhance the
merged firm’s ability and incentive to compete, and why each would
be merger-specific.” 44 They then go on to warn that “[e]fficiency
claims will not be considered if they are vague, speculative, or
otherwise cannot be verified by reasonable means,” that
“[p]rojections of efficiencies may be viewed with skepticism,
particularly when generated outside of the usual business planning
process.” 45 The Guidelines then explicitly state that the agencies will
not give equal weight to efficiencies and harms:
In conducting this analysis, the Agencies will not simply
compare the magnitude of the cognizable efficiencies with the
magnitude of the likely harm to competition absent the
efficiencies. The greater the potential adverse competitive
effect of a merger, the greater must be the cognizable
efficiencies, and the more they must be passed through to
customers, for the Agencies to conclude that the merger will
not have an anticompetitive effect in the relevant market. When
the potential adverse competitive effect of a merger is likely to
be particularly substantial, extraordinarily great cognizable
efficiencies would be necessary to prevent the merger from
being anticompetitive. In adhering to this approach, the
Agencies are mindful that the antitrust laws give competition,
not internal operational efficiency, primacy in protecting
customers. 46
The asymmetrical treatment between expected harms and
efficiencies is not merely a function of parsing the Guidelines’ text.
Despite some greater sympathy toward efficiencies in recent years,

44

Id. § 10.
Id.
46
Id.
45
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practitioners report that the agencies usually react with coolness to
efficiencies arguments. 47
C. EU Legal Principles
EU merger law derives from the EC Merger Regulation. 48 Unlike
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, paragraph 29 of the Merger Regulation
specifically recognizes efficiency defenses. 49 Nonetheless, the scope
of the efficiencies defense and its correspondence with the threshold
of proof necessary to show predicted anticompetitive effects remain
subject to some doubt. 50
Under EU case law, the Commission is accorded “a margin of
discretion” in making its predictions about anticompetitive effects
from mergers. 51 The courts defer to Commission decisions so long
as the “evidence relied on is factually accurate, reliable and
consistent” and the record “contains all the information which must
be taken into account in order to assess a complex situation and
whether it is capable of substantiating the conclusions drawn from
it.” 52 On the other hand, the merging parties bear the burden of
proving that efficiencies are “likely to materialize” and generally
must use “precise and convincing” evidence to do so. 53
The EC Horizontal Merger Guidelines place on the merging
parties the burden of proving efficiencies and require that the
47

See Muris, supra n. xxx at 751 (“Hostility reflects the long standing reluctance to
accept fully the cost-reducing potential of mergers”); see also text accompanying
notes xxx – xxx (FTC study).
48
Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the Control of
Concentrations between Undertakings.
49
Council Regulation ¶ 29 (“In order to determine the impact of a concentration on
competition in the common market, it is appropriate to take account of any
substantiated and likely efficiencies put forward by the undertakings concerned. It
is possible that the efficiencies brought about by the concentration counteract the
effects on competition, and in particular the potential harm to consumers, that it
might otherwise have and that, as a consequence, the concentration would not
significantly impede effective competition, in the common market or in a
substantial part of it, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a
dominant position.”).
50
See Fabienne Ilzkovitz & Roderick Meiklejohn, European Merger Control: Do
We Need an Efficiency Defense, 3 J. Indus., Comp, & Trade 57 (2003).
51
Rynair Holdings, Case T-342/07 (General Court 6 July 2010).
52
Id.
53
Id.
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efficiencies claims “be verifiable such that the Commission can
be
reasonably certain that the efficiencies are likely to materialize.”54
The Non-Horizontal Guidelines seem to strike a softer tone on
efficiencies, suggesting that in the vertical and conglomerate context,
expected efficiencies and anticompetitive effects need to be
weighed. 55 However they later repeat that proving efficiencies is the
parties’ burden and that the same criteria of verifiability as apply
under the Horizontal Guidelines apply to vertical and conglomerate
mergers. 56 Read as a whole, the Non-Horizontal Guidelines “appear
to suggest that the pro-competitive effects of a merger should be
subject to more exacting evidentiary standards than theories of
competitive harm.” 57
As in the United States, European practitioners report that
efficiencies defenses are difficult to sustain, at least in horizontal
merger cases. In vertical merger cases, consistently with the softer
approach in the guidelines, efficiencies defenses have sometimes
been accepted. For example, in TomTom/TeleAtlas, the Commission
found that the vertical integration between a map supplier and a
maker of navigations systems would likely reduce prices to
consumers by a small amount since the vertically integrated firm
would eliminate double marginalization. 58 However, as in many
other cases, the efficiencies argument appears to have merely been
the icing on the key finding—that the merged firms would not have
an incentive to behave anticompetitively. It is unclear whether
efficiencies concerns are doing substantial, independent work in
54

Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council
Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings, ¶ 86 (2004/C
31/03).
55
Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council
Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings, ¶ 21 (2008/C
265/07).
56
Id. ¶ 52.
57
Linklaters and Charles River Associates International, The European
Commission’s Draft Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers,
Comment,
at
4,
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/files_non_horizontal_consultati
on/linklaters.pdf.
The Linklaters and CRA comment addressed the draft
guidelines, but the Commission made no modification to the text that would negate
the comment.
58
See Penelope Papandropoulos, Non-Horizontal Mergers: Recent EC Cases,
(May
29,
2009),
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/economist/non_horizontal_mergers.pdf.
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European merger policy. At a minimum, EU law and practice, like
U.S. law and practice, treats probability adjusted risks and benefits
asymmetrically in merger review.
II. SYSTEMIC EFFECTS OF FORMAL ASYMMETRY
The formal position of the antitrust enforcement agencies and
courts in the U.S. and the EU is that merger efficiencies count only
weakly, if at all, toward sustaining the legality of questionable
mergers. The most obvious implication of this coolness toward
efficiency claims is that some mergers that would be cleared in a
more efficiency hospitable jurisdiction would not be cleared in the
U.S. and the EU. Under this assumption, a change in norms or
practices resulting in a more hospitable reception for efficiencies
should result in a net increase in the number of cleared mergers—in a
liberalization of merger policy.
But that conclusion may be unjustified.
Solicitude for
efficiencies may already play a role in merger policy, but simply not
at the level of individual case analysis. Part of the movement toward
liberalization of merger policy in the last two or three decades may
already reflect a commitment to allowing efficient mergers without
undertaking an individualized look at efficiencies claims. A more
particularized inquiry into merger efficiencies might not result in a
further net liberalization of merger policy but only in a redistribution
of the portfolios of permitted and prohibited mergers.
To set the stage for an answer to these questions, this section first
surveys the incidence and intensity of efficiencies discourse in
merger negotiations between the merging parties and the government
agencies. It then provides a snapshot of the overall liberalization of
merger policy in the U.S. and EU in the past several decades.
Finally, it considers the systemic effects on the landscape of merger
control that might follow from a rebalancing of merger costs and
benefits.
A. Incidence, Intensity, and Effect of Efficiencies Discourse in
Administrative Negotiations
Much of the academic writing on merger efficiencies assumes a
decisional model in which the antitrust agencies might exercise
prosecutorial discretion not to challenge questionable mergers
because of efficiencies but courts would usually serve as the ultimate
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arbiters of mergers’ legality. 59 Hence, much of the scholarly work on
merger efficiencies has focused on judicial attitudes toward
efficiencies. 60
The available empirical work suggests that judges do purport to
take efficiencies into account, but that efficiencies actually play little
role in merger cases. In a recent empirical study of 23 U.S. merger
cases litigated between 1986 and 2009, Jamie Moffitt finds that
“although courts claim to be balancing merger-generated efficiencies
with other negative factors affecting market competition,” they are
actually “making an assessment of the relevant concentration in the
applicable market and then allowing that initial assessment to color
their recognition of claimed efficiencies.” 61 Courts may thus be
“stampeding” the efficiency factor based on their conclusion on
market concentration and possible anticompetitive effects. 62
But courts are no longer significant players in the formulation of
U.S. merger policy. As noted in the previous section, the Hart-ScottRodino Act has pushed most merger control decisions into the
agencies and away from the courts. 63 For example, in 1983 when
Fisher and Lande computed the “Type 3” costs of the greater
complexities that an efficiencies defense would entail, they estimated
twenty to twenty-five litigated merger cases a year. 64 Their estimates
were based on averages from the last decade showing nine FTC
cases, seven Justice Department cases, and five private cases
annually. 65 Since the early 1980s, however, merger enforcement has
moved increasingly in the direction of informal administration
without litigation. 66 Over the period 1990 to 2009, the FTC and
Justice Department only litigated approximately 39 cases in court,

59

See, e.g., Kolasky, supra n. xxx at 82 (discussing role of efficiencies in judicial
decisions regarding mergers); Fisher & Lande, supra n. xxx; Moffitt, supra n. xxx.
60
Id.
61
Moffitt, supra n. xxx at 1698.
62
Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark
Infringement, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 1581, 1581-82 (2006) (describing tendency of
courts in trademark cases to “stampede” in multi-factor analysis by using decision
on a small number of critical factors to determine remaining factors).
63
See supra text accompanying notes xxx – xxx.
64
Fisher & Lande, supra n. xxx at 1675, 1675 n. 312.
65
Id. n. 312.
66
See generally, Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust Antifederalism, 96 Cal. L. Rev. 1, 5157 (2008).
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fewer than a net of two per year for both agencies. 67 For the last
decade, 2000-2009, the total number of litigated merger cases was
only 15. 68 Private antitrust challenges to mergers are even rarer. 69
The same is true in the EU. Litigation over merger cases has
become extremely infrequent. The European Commission has only
prohibited two mergers since 2002, 70 which means that most merger
decisions have been made through internal administrative processes.
Since a brief spurt of activity in 2002, the European courts have had
little work to do on merger policy.
The upshot is that most discussions over merger efficiencies take
place informally in non-public dialogue between the merger parties
(or really, their lawyers and hired economists) and the lawyers and
economists in the antitrust enforcement agencies. To the extent that
bargaining between the parties and the government occurs, it occurs
“in the shadow of the law,” 71 in the sense that it is influenced by the
parties’ expectations about judicial outcomes should they litigate. In
most cases, however, the law’s shadow is comparatively light, since
most merging parties are unwilling to litigate in court should the
agency decide to oppose the merger. 72 The agencies’ merger
guidelines set the stage for the administrative bargains, although the

67

This estimate is drawn from a study of data complied in the FTC and Justice’s
Hart Scott Rodino Annual Report, which are available on the FTC’s website.
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/anncompreports.shtm. The estimate of 39 is based on the
reported number of cases in which the agencies filed a complaint in federal court
and the court took some action. In a much larger number of cases, the agencies
filed for a preliminary or permanent injunction and either the parties
contemporaneously filed for a consent decree or the merging parties abandoned the
transaction without a judicial decision.
68
Id.
69
Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Economists at the Gate: Antitrust in the TwentyFirst Century, 38 Loy. U. Chi. L. Rev. 513, 584 (2007) (noting that “[p]rivate
parties rarely challenge mergers under Section 7 of the Clayton Act”).
70
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/statistics.pdf.
71
Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L.J. 950, 978 (1979).
72
Robert Pitofsky, Proposals for Revised United States Merger Enforcement
Guidelines in a Global Economy, 81 Geo. L. J. 195, 225 (1992); Crane, Antitrust
Antifederalism, supra n. xxx at xxx.
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guidelines are not legally binding 73 and their predictive power on
agency attitudes is not always strong. 74
Despite the prohibitive odds that efficiencies will make a
difference in close-call cases, merging parties usually go through the
ropes and make efficiency arguments. A survey of 20 leading
antitrust practitioners conducted by Jon Baker and Carl Shapiro in
2007 revealed that the antitrust agencies had become significantly
more receptive to efficiencies claims than they were a decade
before. 75 Still, the data suggest that efficiencies arguments are
seldom dispositive in close-call merger cases. A recent study of 186
merger cases at the FTC found that internal staff memoranda reported
efficiencies claims in 147 out of 186 cases. 76 In the cases in which
the FTC staff reported the claimed dollar value of the claimed
efficiencies, the mean figures ranged from $191 million to $237
million depending on the time period. 77 The claimed efficiencies
represented an average of 8.1 percent of the transaction’s reported
value. 78 Efficiencies claims did not meet with particularly great
success, at least in the Bureau of Competition (which is generally
manned by lawyers). The Bureau of Competition discussed 342
efficiency claims (multiple efficiencies could be claimed in a single
transaction), rejecting 109, accepting 29, and offering no conclusion
on 204. 79 Efficiencies claims fared considerably better at the Bureau
of Economics (which is generally manned by economists), which
considered 311 efficiencies claims, accepting 84, rejecting 37, and
making no decision as to 190. 80
73

FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 716 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (observing that
“the Merger Guidelines are not binding on the court”).
74
See Christine A. Varney, An Update on the Review of the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/254577.htm (“A consistent
theme running through the panels is that there are indeed gaps between the
Guidelines and actual agency practice--gaps in the sense of both omissions of
important factors that help predict the competitive effects of mergers and
statements that are either misleading or inaccurate.”}.
75
Jonathan B. Baker & Carl Shapiro, Reinvigorating Horizontal Merger
Enforcement, http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/mergerpolicy.pdf, at 29-30.
76
Malcolm B. Coate & Andrew J. Heimert, Merger Efficiencies at the Federal
Trade Commission, http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/02/0902mergerefficiencies.pdf., at
6.
77
Id. at 12.
78
Id.
79
Id. at 16.
80
Id. at 22.
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Two factors are notable in these data. The first is the significant
difference in perspective between the lawyer and economist classes
in the agencies—an issue to which we will return in Part III. The
second is the relative unimportance of efficiencies in merger analysis.
The practice in the antitrust agencies seems to be liberal invocation
of efficiencies arguments by the parties without a serious expectation
of moving the agencies in most cases. To the extent that the agencies
ultimately cite efficiencies considerations in clearing mergers,
antitrust practitioners report that they are often treated as “icing on
the cake” in cases where there are no serious anticompetitive effects
concerns. As former FTC Chairman Tim Muris has observed, “[t]oo
often, the Agencies found no cognizable efficiencies when
anticompetitive effects were determined to be likely and seemed to
recognize efficiency only when no adverse effects were predicted.” 81
As in the courts, efficiencies discourse appears frequently in merger
administration, but its influence on overall merger policy seems to be
weak.
B. The Liberalization of Merger Policy
Thus far, we have been considering the efficacy of efficiencies
arguments as independent factors in merger policy as though
efficiencies and anticompetitive effects were the credits and debits in
a tidy system of double-entry bookkeeping that only interacted when
tallied at the bottom of the page. But, in fact, perspectives on
efficiencies can enter merger policy at a variety of different points.
A Bayesian prior belief that many mergers produce desirable
efficiencies may push judges, legislators, or antitrust enforcers to
take a solicitous view of mergers as a general proposition, even if
they fail to credit case-specific efficiency arguments much of the
time.
Indeed, one prevailing normative view is precisely this—that
legal systems should take into account merger efficiencies by
articulating relatively lenient merger standards across the board
rather than trying to explore efficiencies arguments on a case-by-case
basis. In perhaps the most influential article to make this point,
Fisher and Lande argued against allowance of a merger efficiency
defense on a case-by-case basis on the grounds that efficiencies,
81

Timothy Muris, The Government and Merger Efficiencies: Still Hostile After All
These Years, 7 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 729, 731 (1999).
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although often present in mergers, are hard to detect on a casespecific basis. 82 They also observed that allowing an efficiencies
defense would increase both type 1 and type 2 error costs and what
they styled type 3 error costs—the increased costs to businesses,
enforcers, and decision makers from the increased complexity and
unpredictability of an efficiencies defense. 83 Instead of allowing an
efficiencies defense on a case-by-case basis, Fisher and Lande would
“raise[] the market-share thresholds of presumptive illegality to
account for potential efficiencies gains,” thus recognizing an
efficiency defense by liberalizing merger policy overall. 84
It may be the case that Fisher and Lande’s recommendation has
been de facto accepted in the last two decades. It is certainly the case
that the U.S. antitrust enforcement agencies have revised upward
their presumptions on the thresholds of market concentration
necessary for horizontal mergers to raise competitive concerns.
Under the Horizontal Merger Guidelines in place from 1992 to 2010,
markets were considered unconcentrated if the Herfindahl-Hirschman
(“HHI”) index 85 was below 1000, moderately concentrated if
between 1000 and 1800, and concentrated if above 1800. 86 Under
the 2010 Guidelines, markets are unconcentrated if the HHI is below
1500, moderately concentrated if between 1500 and 2500, and
concentrated over 2500. 87 The agencies have also raised the
thresholds for the increase in concentration resulting from a merger
to raise competitive concerns. 88
One should be careful about reaching the conclusion that the
antitrust agencies have become generally more permissive with
respect to mergers based merely on this HHI inflation. Concentration
ratios have become less significant in merger analysis in the past two

82

Fisher & Lande, supra n. xxx at 1651-68.
Id. at 1670.
84
Id. at 1669.
85
The HHI index is computed by squaring the sums of the market shares of the
market participants.
86
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/horizmer.shtm.
87
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.html#5c.
88
Under the 1992 Guidelines, an increase over 100 in a highly concentrated market
created a presumption that the merger would create market power or facilitate its
exercise. Under the 2010 Guidelines over 200 in highly concentrated markets
result in a presumption that the merger will create market power or facilitate its
exercise.
83
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decades. 89 In large part, this reflects an overall shift in merger
policing from homogenous goods markets—where markets are
relatively easier to define, market shares easier to computer, and
hence market concentration changes easier to calculate—to
differentiated goods or services markets where markets are difficult
to define robustly, shares are difficult to calculate robustly, and hence
concentration indices are often close to meaningless. 90 This shift in
focus toward differentiated goods markets and unilateral effects
theories has been driven in large part by fundamental changes in the
economy itself. As the economy has continued its evolution away
from bricks and mortar and traditional manufacturing industries
toward information and technology industries, it has moved in the
direction of differentiation and heterogeneity of brands. 91 But even if
the liberalization of concentration ratios does not alone signal an
overall liberalization of merger policy, there is little doubt that
merger policy is far more liberal today than it was twenty or thirty
years ago. 92
Not only have the agencies’ relaxed their formal concentration
criteria in merger cases, but the prospects for defendant victories in
litigated cases have improved dramatically in the last several
decades. In dissenting in Von’s Grocery in 1966, Justice Stewart
could comment sarcastically that “[t]he sole consistency that I can
find in litigation under Section 7 [of the Clayton Act] is that the

89

Under the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, it may no longer be necessary to
define a relevant market in every case. HMG § 4 (“Some of the analytical tools
used by the Agencies to assess competitive effects do not rely on market definition
. . .”). See also Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 437
(2010) (arguing that market definition is incoherent and unproductive in antitrust
cases).
90
Carl Shapiro, The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: From Hedgehog to Fox
in Forty Years, 77 Antitrust L. J. 49, 54 (2010).
91
CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO
THE NETWORK ECONOMY 22-23 (1999) (describing characteristics of information
economies).
92
See generally, D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust, Institutions, and Merger Control, 17
Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1055, 1128-29 (2010) (reporting survey of antitrust
practitioners reporting ambiguous views as to whether merger enforcement at the
Justice Department was more lenient in the Bush administration than in the Clinton
Administration and a uniform view that merger review at the FTC was not more
lenient under Bush than under Clinton).
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Government always wins.” 93 Even as late as the early 1980s, Fisher
and Lande asserted that “defendant merger victories not surprisingly
have been relatively rare.” 94 If anything, the trend in the last decade
has been toward defendant victories in litigated merger cases, with
prominent government defeats in cases like Oracle/PeoplesSoft 95 and
Arch Coal. 96 During the 2000s, defendants won half of the
preliminary injunction actions brought by the FTC or Justice
Department. 97 To the extent that the shadow of the law plays a
significant role in the regulatory administration of mergers, the
calculus has shifted in a decidedly pro-merger direction.
Although the European model of merger review is quite different
from the American model and European merger control generally
tighter than American merger control, 98 Europe has seen a similar
trend toward a more active judicial role in questioning European
Commission decisions prohibiting mergers in the last decade. During
the early-2000s in particular, the European Court of Justice reversed
the Commission’s merger prohibition decision in a surprising string
of cases that departed significantly from the Court’s prior willingness
to accord the Commission discretion in merger cases. 99 Since those
decisions, the Commission seems to have become considerably more
cautious in its prohibition decisions, to the point that some academic
commentators and Commission officials wonder whether it has
become too lenient in merger enforcement. 100
There is no doubt that merger policy in both the U.S. and the EU
is more liberal than it was three decades ago in the U.S. or a decade
93

United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
94
Fisher & Lande, supra n. xxx at 1583.
95
U.S. v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
96
FTC v. Arch Coal, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 109 (D.D.C. 2004).
97
According to the agencies’ joint Hart-Scott-Rodino Act annual reports, available
at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/anncompreports.shtm, the agencies won six preliminary
injunction cases and lost six during the period 2000-2009.
98
Mats A. Bergman, Malcolm B. Coate, Maria Jakobsson & Shawn W. Ulrick,
Comparing Merger Policies: The European Union versus the United States, 07-01
Potomac Papers L. & Econ. (2007) (finding that European horizontal merger policy
is generally more restrictive than U.S. merger policy).
99
See Francisco Todorov & Anthony Valcke, Judicial Review of Merger Control
Decisions in the European Union, Antitrust Bulletin June 22, 2006.
100
See Frank Maier-Rigaud & Kay Parplies, EU Merger Control Five Years After
the Introduction of the SIEC Test: What Explains the Drop in Enforcement
Activity?, [2009] E.C.L.R. 565.
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and a half ago in Europe. What is impossible to say to any great
certainty is whether solicitude over merger efficiencies has
significantly influenced this trend. Whether or not it has, the
comparatively liberal state of merger policy today has implications
for any reconsideration of the asymmetrical treatment of merger
anticompetitive risks and efficiencies. Any movement toward greater
consideration of merger efficiencies could propel overall merger
policy in a yet more lenient direction, which could in turn induce
political backlash against the overall trend in merger policy. 101
C. Effects on Distribution of Proposed and Challenged Mergers
The apparent implication of re-valuing merger efficiencies
relative to anticompetitive effects is that courts and regulators would
begin to permit some number of marginal mergers that they
previously would have disallowed. To the extent that the antitrust
system is currently disallowing or discouraging a significant number
of beneficial mergers, a reorientation of the relevant legal and
administrative norms could result in net social welfare improvement.
Indeed, the mergers currently screened out by prevailing norms may
be precisely the most beneficial ones. Jamie Moffitt argues that the
courts’ hostility to merger efficiency defenses chills businesses’
willingness to propose “exactly those [deals] that have the greatest
potential to enhance competition”—high-efficiency transactions in
concentrated industries. 102
On the other hand, viewed as a proposal to liberalize merger
policy, the normative appeal of the symmetry principle seems to
depend not merely on its internal logic but on some prior belief that
contemporary merger policy in the U.S., EU, or other jurisdiction is
excessively restrictive. Since many commentators believe that U.S.
101

Significantly, as a presidential candidate, Senator Barack Obama targeted the
Bush Administration’s merger policy for criticism: “Regrettably, the current
administration has what may be the weakest record of antitrust enforcement of any
administration in the last half-century. As president, I will direct my administration
to reinvigorate antitrust enforcement. It will step up review of merger activity and
take effective action to stop or restructure those mergers that are likely to harm
consumer welfare, while quickly clearing those that do not.” Senator Barack
Obama, Statement for the American Antitrust Institute 2 (Sept. 27, 2007), available
at www.antitrustinstitute.org/files/aai-%20Presidential%20campaign%̈%20Obama%209-07_092720071759.pdf.
102
Moffitt, supra n. xxx at 1743.
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merger policy in particular has already become too permissive, 103 the
mere internal logic of the symmetry principle may seem an
insufficient reason to recalibrate merger policy in favor of even more
liberal merger review.
But revaluing merger efficiencies relative to anticompetitive
effects does not require holding constant the rest of merger policy.
Even without any formal adjustment to other aspects of merger law,
revaluing merger efficiencies could end up having no net effect on
overall merger policy liberality. Indeed, an explicit symmetry
principle could induce legal decision-makers to give greater credence
to anticompetitive effects theories in some cases than they presently
do. Several possible systemic reactions to an enhanced willingness
by agencies or courts to credit merger efficiencies arguments point
toward neutrality in overall merger leniency.
First, assuming that Fisher and Lande’s proposal to embed prior
beliefs about merger efficiencies in overall leniency toward mergers
captures part of the influence for merger liberalization in the last
several decades, then a higher valuation of efficiencies could alter
courts’ and agencies’ overall willingness to prohibit certain classes of
mergers. Assuming that merger control institutions display an
unconscious tendency to increase the threshold of proof required for
anticompetitive effects theories because they are prohibited,
culturally or legally, from giving significant weight to merger
efficiencies arguments, then a reversal of the norm on efficiencies
could also lead to a reversal of the norm on anticompetitive effects
theories.
Second, alteration in the efficiencies norm could alter overall
regulatory or legal decision-making processes on mergers by
affecting judges or regulators’ assessment of the probability of
anticompetitive effects. Decision-makers asked to assign a
probability value to two related events may anchor their
determination of one event’s probability on their assessment of the

103

See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker & Carl Shapiro, Reinvigorating Horizontal Merger
Enforcement, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECT
OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST 235 (Robert Pitofsky,
ed., 2008) (criticizing recent U.S. merger enforcement as excessively lax); William
E. Kovacic, Rating the Competition Agencies:
What Constitutes Good
Performance?, 16 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 903, 915 (2009) (reporting that
commentators have called U.S. merger enforcement excessively lax).
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other event’s probability. 104 Judges or regulators asked to decide on
the absolute probability that a merger will produce anticompetitive
effects might tend to low-ball the probability because of a general
skeptical inclination as to proof of speculative future events, but raise
their estimate of the probability of harms if asked to assess that
probability at the same time that they were assessing the probability
of efficiencies.
One might object that if judges or regulators systematically raised
their estimates of future anticompetitive effects if faced with
efficiencies defenses, then merging parties would have diminished
incentives to make efficiencies claims in the first place. If that were
to occur, the agencies might respond by affirmatively insisting that
the merging parties in close-call cases provide the efficiencies
justifications for their mergers. Then there is a question of net effects.
If the only effect of adopting the symmetry principle were that judges
and regulators would become less skeptical of anticompetitive effects
claims, then the symmetrical treatment project would not result in a
true re-valuation of merger efficiencies and, indeed, would seem
pointless. But even if revaluing efficiencies defenses did not lead to
an overall increase in the number of permitted mergers, it could still
have a salutary effect on the selection of mergers that are permitted
and prohibited. In the class of marginal merger cases—the class
most likely to be affected by any adjustment in legal principle—there
might well be a socially beneficial increase in permission for mergers
creating net consumer (or social) benefits and a corresponding
decrease in mergers creating net consumer (or social) harm.
Finally, it is possible that antitrust regulators have an
exogenously determined appetite for merger prohibition decisions, in
effect a “merger quota” that they need to fill regardless of the merits
of individual merger applications. Within a particular political and
economic context, regulators may approach merger control with a
rough and perhaps unconscious sense of the number of prohibition
decisions (or, more generally, requirements that parties restructure
questionable deals) they need to produce in order to justify their
budgetary allocations, show themselves sufficiently tough but not
obstacles to business progress, and satisfy political demand for
104

See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 Sci. 1124, 1128 (1974); Amos Tversky &
Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. Bus. S251
(1986).
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“action from Washington or Brussels.” Much of the ideological
discourse about the stringency of antitrust activity consists of
counting up merger challenges and other antitrust enforcement
activity within particular administrations. 105 If even a soft and
fluctuating merger quota exists, then a decision to revalue
efficiencies could lead to an increase in permission for some
categories of mergers and a decrease in permission for other
categories.
It is impossible to demonstrate or quantify the effect of any of
these factors with certainty, but it seems probable that the relative
coolness to merger efficiency arguments may not simply diminish the
number of procompetitive mergers with high efficiencies, but alter
the overall portfolio of mergers that firms consider and propose and
that agencies and courts allow and prohibit. This by itself is not a
sufficient reason to adopt a symmetry principle whereby efficiencies
and harms of equal weight and probability should be equally
weighted. It is, however, a reason to scrutinize the set of possible
justifications for the principle of asymmetry embedded in U.S. and
EU law and practice and currently being emulated by the scores of
merger control regimes developing around the world. 106
III. SOURCES OF HOSTILITY TO MERGER EFFICIENCIES
Neither U.S. nor EU law—including the relevant statutory or
treaty provisions, implementing regulations or enforcement
guidelines, and case law—contains an explicit acknowledgment of,
or justification or, the asymmetry between predictive harms and
efficiencies described in the previous section. To be sure, numerous
statements as to the reasons for downplaying efficiencies defenses
appear from time to time, but the relevant legal sources make no
effort to provide a systematic account for the asymmetry. This
section identifies and critically evaluates seven possible
justifications.

105

See, e.g., Kovacic, supra n. xxx at 915 (responding to criticisms of Bush era
merger enforcement).
106
Fox & Crane, supra n. xxx 451 (discussing proliferation of merger control
regimes around the globe).
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A. Productive Efficiencies Do Not Always Benefit Consumers
The most probable explanation for the asymmetry is an implicit
concern that any efficiencies generated by the merger will be
captured by the merging firms, but not passed onto consumers. Since
Oliver Williamson’s seminal article in 1968, 107 it has been well
understood that mergers can simultaneously generate efficiencies and
consumer harm if the merging firms appropriate the efficiencies
solely for themselves as cost savings and fail to pass them onto
consumers. Total societal welfare may be maximized if the cost
savings exceed the sum of the consumer deadweight losses (and
wealth transfers, if we count those as social costs), and yet consumer
welfare may fall.
Where mergers generate total welfare increases but diminish
consumer welfare, the merger-control regime must decide whether to
accept a total welfare or consumer welfare (or, allocative efficiency,
its cognate) standard. In both the U.S. and the EU, the currently
prevailing regimes seem to favor a consumer welfare standard. Under
EU law, any merger efficiencies must be sufficient to offset the
anticompetitive impact on consumers, 108 which means that cost
savings from mergers that are not passed onto consumers
normatively count for nothing. The U.S. agencies are less clear on
this point, but the bottom line seems to be a commitment to a
consumer welfare perspective. The current guidelines state that
“[t]he Agencies will not challenge a merger if cognizable efficiencies
are of a character and magnitude such that the merger is not likely to
be anticompetitive in any relevant market” and that “the Agencies
consider whether cognizable efficiencies likely would be sufficient to
reverse the merger’s potential to harm customers in the relevant
market, e.g., by preventing price increases in that market.” 109
By contrast, Canada explicitly follows a total welfare standard,
with apparent implications for the relative weighting of efficiencies
and harms. The Canadian Competition Act not only allows a merger
defense, but also commits Canada to a total welfare standard for
mergers under which predicted harms are to be balanced against cost
107

Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense:
Tradeoffs, 58 Am. Econ. Rev. 18 (1968).
108
EC Horizontal Merger Guidelines, ¶ 79.
109
HMG § 10.
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savings from the merger, whether or not those savings are ultimately
passed on to consumers. Canadian case law calls for a ‘balancing
weights standard” under which “any increase in surplus arising from
the efficiency gain from the merger is balanced against the
deadweight loss resulting from the likely anti-competitive effects of
the merger and, where appropriate, some portion (including possibly
all or none) of the associated transfer of surplus from consumers to
producers.” 110 Canadian law places the burden of proving harms on
the Competition Bureau and the burden of proving offsetting benefits
on the merging parties, 111 but seems to place no greater weight on
either side of the scale.
The American and European commitment to a consumer welfare
criterion for merger review may provide a strong positive explanation
for the asymmetrical treatment of harms and efficiencies, but not a
normatively appealing one.
Even assuming that normative
commitment to consumer welfare rather than total social welfare is
appropriate, this is no reason to discriminate against efficiencies in
the probability requirement. If the commitment to the consumer
welfare objective is what motivates the dismissal of certain forms of
efficiency defenses, then the hostility to efficiencies claims should be
limited to those that are not passed onto consumers. Instead, both the
American and European guidelines cut twice against efficiencies
defenses, first by insisting that only consumer-benefiting efficiencies
be recognized and second by requiring heightened proof as to even
consumer-benefiting efficiencies.
One might respond that the guidelines are not really doublediscounting efficiencies but rather reflecting the fact that antitrust
agencies will cast a jaundiced eye on efficiencies claims since
efficiencies often will not benefit consumers. But casting a jaundiced
eye at efficiencies writ large would only be appropriate if the
agencies did not have adequate tools for predicting which merger
efficiencies will be passed onto consumers and which will be
appropriated by the merging firms. In fact, antitrust economics has
robust predictive tools for making those determinations. Generally, it
110

Canadian Competition Bureau Bulletin, Efficiencies in Merger Review, (March
2, 2009), http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/02982.html
(citing Canada (Commissioner of Competition) v. Superior Propane Inc. (August
30, 2000), CT-1998/002 (Canadian Competition Tribunal)).
111
Id.
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is well understood that fixed cost savings are likely to be
appropriated by the merging firms but that marginal cost savings are
likely to be passed on, to some degree, to consumers. 112 Economists
have developed models for determining the level of marginal cost
reductions necessary to prevent price increases in unilateral effects
cases in differentiated goods, 113 and separately in coordinated
interaction cases involving homogeneous products. 114 Other
economic work shows that, as a general matter, fifty percent should
be the minimum pass-through for marginal cost reductions. 115
In light of the sophistication of economic knowledge on whether
merger efficiencies are likely to be passed along to consumers, there
is no reason for undifferentiated hostility to efficiencies defenses
even if a jurisdiction believes that only consumer-benefiting
efficiencies should count. Given those priors, the appropriate
approach is to require evidence of consumer-benefiting efficiencies,
not to cast a pall over efficiencies claims as a class.
One institutional explanation for the asymmetry of treatment is
that the lawyer class in the antitrust agencies distrusts the economist
class. As a class, economists (including many of the staff economists
working in the antitrust enforcement agencies) tend to support a total
welfare standard for antitrust, believing that antitrust is a poor vehicle
for addressing distributive concerns. 116 By contrast, the lawyer
112

See Kenneth Heyer, Welfare Standards and Merger Analysis: Why Not the
Best?, Economic Analysis Group Discussion Paper (March 2006),
http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/pdf/references/heyer-ken-06-8.pdf.
113
G. Werden, “A Robust Test for Consumer Welfare Enhancing Mergers among
Sellers of Differentiated Products,” 44 J. INDUS. ECON. 409 (1996).
114
L. Froeb & G. Werden, “A Robust Test for Consumer Welfare Enhancing
Mergers among Sellers of a Homogeneous Product,” US Dept. of Justice Antitrust
Division, Economic Analysis Group Discussion Paper 97-1 (1997).
115
J. Hausman and G. Leonard, “Efficiencies From the Consumer Viewpoint,” 7
GEO. L. REV. 707 (1999); but see O. Ashenfelter, “Identifying the Firm-Specific
Cost Pass-Through Rate,” FTC Bureau of Economics Working Paper No. 217
(1998)(estimating 21% pass through rate for Office Depot/Staples merger).
116
See, e.g., Gregory J. Werden, Monoposony and the Sherman Act: Consumer
Welfare in a New Light, 74 Antitrust L. J. 707, 708 n. 5 (2007) (“Many economists
advocate what is termed a total surplus or total welfare standard); Kenneth Heyer,
Welfare Standards and Merger Analysis: Why Not the Best?, Competition Pol’y
Int’l, Autumn 2006, at 29 (arguing for total welfare standard); William J. Kolasky
& Andrew R. Dick, 71 Antitrust L. J. 207, 230 (2003) (noting that most economists
argue for a total welfare approach); Fisher & Lande, supra n. xxx at 1649 (“[M]ost
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class—reflecting the “consumer welfare” perspective of the courts
and a moralistic concern about wealth redistribution and consumer
“rights—tends to prefer a consumer welfare standard. 117
This asymmetry in perspective between the economist and lawyer
classes shows up in empirical work concerning the separate analysis
of efficiency claims by lawyers working in the FTC’s Bureau of
Competition and the lawyers working in the Bureau of Economics. 118
In the study of internal staff reports regarding 147 transactions for
which a second request for documents 119 was issued, the study’s
authors found that the Bureau of Competition’s lawyers accepted
eight percent of efficiencies claimed by the merging parties whereas
the Bureau of Economics’ economists accepted twenty-seven percent
of the parties’ efficiency claims. 120 The FTC’s economists seem to
lend considerably greater credence to efficiencies claims than do
their lawyer peers.
Empirical work has shown that the lawyer class tends to
predominate in influence over the economist class in the antitrust
enforcement agencies. 121 The devaluation of merger efficiencies in
the merger guidelines and in case law may reflect the lawyer class’s
effort to prevent the emergence of an implicit total welfare standard.
The mere articulation of the consumer welfare standard in guidelines

economists argue that antitrust law are a very poor method of wealth redistribution,
and that sound public policy requires one to separate redistribution concerns
completely from efficiencies analysis”); Kenneth Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust:
Other than Competition and Efficiency, What Else Counts?, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1191 (1977) (summarizing economic arguments in favor of an efficiency standard).
117
See, e.g., John B. Kirkwood, Buyer Power and Exclusionary Conduct: Should
Brooke Group Set the Standards for Buyer-Induced Price Discrimination and
Predatory Bidding?, 72 Antitrust L. J. 625, 631 n. 11 (2005) (observing that “many
leading law professors” prefer a consumer welfare standard).
118
Malcolm B. Coate & Andrew J. Heimert, Merger Efficiencies at the Federal
Trade Commission, http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/02/0902mergerefficiencies.pdf.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Malcolm B. Coate, Richard S. Higgins & Fred S. McChesney, Beaucracy and
Politics in FTC Merger Challenges, in THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF
ANTITRUST: A PUBLIC CHOICE PERSPECTIVE 213-230 (Fred S. McChesney &
William F. Shughart II eds.,1995) (finding based on empirical study that a
“disagreement between economists and lawyers about whether to challenge a
merger is not a ‘fair fight.’ Lawyers have greater influence with the commission
over the decision.”).
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and case law may be perceived (consciously or unconsciously) as
insufficient to ensure that only consumer welfare enhancing
efficiencies count in the relevant calculus.
B. Efficiencies Claims Are Difficult to Prove
One possible reason for the marginalization of efficiencies
defenses is that efficiencies may be difficult to prove. Both the U.S.
Horizontal Guidelines and the agencies’ Commentaries on the
guidelines note that many purported efficiencies are simply never
proven or could be achieved in ways less restrictive of
competition. 122 Even in cases where the merging parties prevail in
court or before the agencies in arguing that merger is unlikely to
create anticompetitive effects, they often lose on the question of
whether they have shown offsetting efficiencies. Thus, for example,
in the Oracle-PeopleSoft litigation, Judge Walker rejected the Justice
Department’s anticompetitive effects claims, but also rejected
Oracle’s efficiency justifications as unproven. 123
The justification for this systematic skepticism that efficiencies
claims have not been proven with adequate certainty cannot be just
that the efficiencies claims concern a future event—the parties’ cost
curve following the consummation of the merger—and hence are
inherently speculative. Predictions about anticompetitive share the
same property—they rely on probabilistic efforts to divine the
future. 124
A more serious objection is that the current state of economic
thinking has robust tools for establishing anticompetitive effects but
not such robust models for forecasting efficiencies. Hence, one
might believe that given specified demand diversion ratios, unilateral
anticompetitive effects of a certain magnitude are highly likely to
follow if the merging parties are the producers of each other’s best
substitutes. One might also believe that predictions about how
combining productive inputs such as factories, machines, intellectual
property, or distribution channels are inherently speculative because
122

Department of Justice and FTC Commentary on the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines,
§
4
(March
2006),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/215247.htm#46.
123
U.S. v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
124
See infra text accompanying notes xxx – xxx.
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there are no tested and reliable models for predicting such effects. 125
Combining these two prior beliefs, one would then approach
anticompetitive effects stories with greater credulity than efficiencies
stories.
But this explanation—even if an accurate positive account—does
not provide a strong normative justification for the asymmetrical
treatment of costs and benefits. For one, in at least one
circumstance—innovation theory—the antitrust authorities treat
harms and efficiencies asymmetrically even though they derive from
the identical mechanism—innovation through research and
development. Under the 2010 guidelines, the agencies highlight
concerns over the reduction of innovation incentives as a possible
anticompetitive effect of mergers. For example, Section 6.4 of the
guidelines state that “[t]he Agencies may consider whether a merger
is likely to diminish innovation competition by encouraging the
merged firm to curtail its innovative efforts below the level that
would prevail in the absence of the merger.” 126 On the other hand,
when discussing efficiencies defenses, the guidelines state that
research and development synergies “are potentially substantial but
are generally less susceptible to verification and may be the result of
anticompetitive output reductions.” 127 Some economists claim that
innovation effects from mergers are too speculative to predict with
anything approaching scientific rigor, 128 but that should lead to equal
discounting of innovation-harm theories and innovation-enhancement
defenses. The guidelines appear to give ordinary credence to
innovation-harm theories even while discounting innovationenhancement defenses. Whether or not this is justified in some way,
the explanation cannot be a difference in prior beliefs about the
likelihood that innovation effects can be proven to an adequate level
of probability. 129
125

One might simultaneously believe that there are good models for predicting
whether marginal cost savings will be passed onto consumers, see supra xxx, and
that there are not good models for predicting whether mergers will achieve
marginal cost savings.
126
HMG, § 6.4.
127
Id. , § 10.
128
See, e.g., Richard Rapp, The Misapplication of the Innovation Market Approach
to Merger Analysis, 64 Antitrust L. J. 19 (1995).
129
Empirical work has shown, albeit weakly, that the FTC staff tend to give greater
weight to dynamic efficiency claims than to static efficiency claims, suggesting an
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Beyond the example of inconsistency with respect to innovation
theories, the asymmetrical treatment of harms and benefits cannot be
justified conceptually based on the relative differences in strength of
probabilistic proof. The fact that parties may not be able to prove
efficiencies in fact does not justify maintaining a different standard
of proof. It is circular to say that efficiencies should not be lightly
used to justify potentially anticompetitive mergers because
efficiencies are difficult to prove, and then reject a particular instance
of purported efficiencies because it failed to meet the high standard
of proof.
C. Mergers Are Driven By Kingdom-Building Rather than
Increasing Shareholder Value
A related explanation for efficiency claim scepticism may derive
from a general suspicion that mergers are driven by corporate
managers eager to enlarge their “fiefdoms” rather than by
maximizing returns to shareholders. Various empirical studies have
shown that many large corporate mergers generate negative
shareholder returns. 130 For instance, Scherer and Ravenscraft
showed that the massive merger wave that peaked during the 1960s
resulted in manufacturing inefficiencies that reduced U.S. real gross
national product by between 0.074 and 0.101 percentage points
between 1968 and 1976. 131 Carl Shapiro, the current Deputy
Assistant Attorney General for Economics at the Antitrust division
has taken the position that “the evidence from the finance,
managerial, and economics literatures shows that many mergers do
not work out well . . . This evidence certainly does not support the
view that merger-specific efficiencies are common or that claims of

implicit inflation in the value of dynamic efficiency claims to match the staff’s
overall willingness to accept dynamic inefficiency claims (i.e., theories of harm to
innovation incentives resulting from the post-merger exercise of market power).
Coate & Heimert, supra n. xxx at 19.
130
See, e.g., DAVID J. RAVENSCRAFT & F.M. SCHERER, MERGERS, SELL-OFFS, AND
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY (1987).
131
F.M. Scherer, A New Retrospective on Mergers, 28 Rev. Indus. Org. 327, 329
(2006) (reporting on key findings from earlier book).
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efficiencies made by merging parties should generally be
credited.” 132
But even assuming that this empire-building/agency cost account
of merger activity is true as to some portion of mergers, 133 it does not
provide a sufficient reason for a merger policy asymmetry between
costs and efficiencies either. Even if large corporate mergers as a
class systematically fail to generate efficiencies, that finding provides
relatively little information on the likelihood that the specific class of
mergers under consideration in difficult merger review decisions are
inherently unlikely to create efficiencies. For instance, Scherer and
Ravenscraft’s study focused on conglomerate mergers, which are not
generally a subject of antitrust scrutiny. 134 As Scherer has written
more recently, “[o]ne might expect opportunities for cost savings and
benefits from complementarity to be much stronger for horizontal
and vertical mergers than for conglomerates, and so the record of
widespread failure we documented may simply have become
irrelevant.” 135 As to the class of mergers in which the efficiency
defense generally comes into play, there is no reason for strong prior
beliefs as to whether efficiencies are likely or unlikely.
D. Counterattacking Optimism Bias
A possible justification related to, but analytically distinct from,
the last two discussed is that governments and courts need to adjust
the standard of proof because proposed mergers are systemically

132

Jonathan B. Baker and Carl Shapiro, Reinvigorating Horizontal Merger
Enforcement,” paper presented at the Kirkpatrick Conference on Conservative
Economic Influence on U.S. Antitrust Policy, Georgetown University Law Center,
October
2007,
available
at:
http://
faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/SHAPIRO/mergerpolicy.pdf.
133
There are, of course, competing views. See, e.g., G. BENSTON, CONGLOMERATE
MERGERS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND REMEDIES (1980).
134
Alan Devlin, Antitrust in an Era of Market Failure, 33 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y
557, 596 (2010) (“Conglomerate mergers, which are combinations of firms that are
neither vertically nor horizontally related, do not bear the potential for unilateral or
coordinated price effects and have not been an object of U.S. antitrust concern in
this generation.”).
135
Scherer, supra n. xxx at 330.
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biased toward over-optimism.136 Generically, business managers
make overly optimistic predictions about the future success of their
firms, including the efficiencies that they could capture from a
merger. 137 Thus, if one were to take the set of all mergers that
managers consider, ask the managers to predict what efficiencies they
might capture from the merger, and then track actual results postmerger, one would expect that sum of captured efficiencies would be
less than the sum predicted by managers. Further, not all managers
who consider mergers carry through with the idea. The ones most
likely actually to propose a merger are the most optimistic ones.
Hence, the set of merger proposals antitrust agencies have to screen
may be skewed toward systemic over optimism. 138 Since regulators
and courts lack good information on which mergers would actually
generate efficiencies, they may need to respond to this systemic bias
by requiring particularly compelling proof of efficiencies.
The problem with this justification for a differential standard of
proof for efficiencies and harms is that it assumes that only one side
of the ledger manifests bias. In order to justify a principle of legal or
administrative asymmetry, it would need to be the case that the
proponents of theories of harm manifest a lesser degree of systemic
bias than the proponents of efficiencies. In civil litigation, for
example, it is obvious that the plaintiffs are biased to see the facts
most favorably to themselves and hence bring many meritless cases.
This would be a good reason to require proof by a standard greater
than preponderance of the evidence except for the fact that
defendants are equally biased in the direction of denying liability and

136

Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806, 806 (1980) (describing phenomenon of
optimism bias).
137
Anand Mohan Goel & Anjan V. Thakor, Rationality, Overconfidence and
Leadership 3-4 (Univ. of Mich. Ross Sch. of Bus. Working Paper Series, Working
Paper No. 00-022, 2000), available at http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/35648
(showing that overconfident managers are more likely to be selected as leaders than
less confident managers).
138
Jonathan B. Baker & Carl Shapiro, Detecting and Reversing the Decline in
Horizontal Merger Enforcement, 22- SUM-Antitrust 29, 33 (2008) (“There is
considerable evidence that acquiring firms are systematically over-optimistic about
the efficiencies they can achieve through acquisition .... This evidence does not
support the view that merger-specific efficiencies are common or that claims of
efficiencies made by merging parties should generally be credited.”).
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seeking exculpation. The accommodation is that the fact-finder must
scrutinize each side of the ledger with some degree of scepticism,
although the standard of proof remains set at equipoise (except in
those cases where, for collateral reasons, some higher degree of proof
is preferred). 139
Conceding that merger proponents are biased to believe that
efficiencies will result, what is the evidence that merger opponents
are neutral with respect to anticompetitive effects? The first class of
relevant merger opponents are the business interests that sometimes
mobilize to persuade the antitrust agencies to block a merger. For
example, when Google announced its intention to purchase ITA
Software, a provider of software services to Internet travel search
sites, a coalition of rivals including Microsoft, Tripadvisor, Expedia,
K ayak, and Hotwire launched a public relations campaign to
convince antitrust enforcers to block the deal. 140 T he E uropean
Commission’ s decision to block GE’ s acquisition of Honeywell may
have been influenced by GE’ s competitors, concerned about a more
powerful rival.141 It is not unusual to observe competitors scrambling
to oppose mergers that may diminish their relative standing in the
market.
Often, the pressures against mergers are more subtle and, indeed,
difficult to assess. Rivals of the merging firms have complex
incentives. They may disfavor the merger because it creates a
stronger competitor, favor the merger because it creates a more
concentrated market in which tacit collusion is easier, disfavor the
merger because it creates a more concentrated market which makes
the rivals’ own future acquisitions harder to justify, or favor agency
approval because it sets a precedent for their own future deals (on the
theory that competition in the market is robust). 142 It is impossible to
capture the direction or magnitude of this bias as a class. Customers

139

MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006).
The coalition’s website is fairsearch.org.
141
Eleanor M. Fox, GE/Honeywell: The U.S. Merger that Europe Stopped—A
Story of the Politics of Convergence, in ANTITRUST STORIES 339 (Eleanor M. Fox
& Daniel A. Crane, eds, 2007) (reporting that teams of lawyers from United
Technology, Rolls-Royce, and Rockwell Collins visited European Commission’s
Directorate General for Competition to complain about the GE/Honeywell deal).
142
See generally HMG § 2.2.3 (discussing difficulties with relying on competitors’
opinions in merger cases).
140

https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/art30

36

FORTHCOMING 110 MICH. L. REV. (2011)

3/4/2011 11:29 AM

Crane:

38

also have incentives with respect to mergers of their suppliers that are
difficult to map. 143
A second kind of bias concerns the incentives of antitrust
enforcers. Public choice literature suggests that antitrust enforcers
are not merely detached public servants on a truth-seeking
expedition. 144 T hey are susceptible to all of the usual biases and
influences of regulators. T hey may oppose mergers in order to
aggrandize their own agency’ s influence, justify their agency’ s
budget, get into newspaper headlines, support a political party’ s
standing, pacify a member of Congress, advance an ideological
agenda, or promote their individual careers.
T his is not to say that antitrust enforcers are untrustworthy as a
class. R ather, it is to acknowledge that systemic bias in merger
control is not unilateral. Unless one believes that the optimism bias
of merger proponents is so strong that it swamps all other
influences—a proposition without substantial support—there is no
reason to deviate from symmetry in the standards of proof for
efficiencies and harms.
E. Efficiencies Create Undue Dominance
The previous lines of argument rested on skepticism that mergers
often generate efficiencies. A different line of argument accepts that
mergers often do generate efficiencies and affirmatively counts them
against the merger on the theory that efficiencies acquired through
merger upset the balance of the playing field and tend toward longrun dominance in the merging firms.
This suspicion of merger efficiencies as creating unwholesome
competitive advantages has a storied history in U.S. case law. In
Brown Shoe, the court found that the efficiencies created by vertical
integration between a shoe manufacturing company and a shoe
retailer counted against a vertical mergers since “by eliminating
wholesalers and by increasing the volume of purchases from the
manufacturing division of the enterprise, [the merging parties] can
143

Ken Heyer, Predicting the Competitive Effects of Mergers by Listening to
Customers, 74 Antitrust L. J. 87 (2007).
144
See generally THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF ANTITRUST: A PUBLIC
CHOICE PERSPECTIVE (Fred S. McChesney & William F. Shughart II eds., 1995).
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market their own brands at prices below those of competing
independent retailers.” 145 The FTC extended this view in In re
Foremost Dairies, 146 where it rejected a dairy industry merger that
would likely have resulted in significant synergies and access to
capital markets. 147 The Commission held that a showing “that the
acquiring firm possesses significant market power in some markets
or that its overall organization gives it a decided advantage in
efficiency over its smaller rivals” demonstrates a violation of Section
7 of the Clayton Act. 148 In Procter & Gamble, the Supreme Court
back away from the view that efficiencies could count against a
merger, holding that they could count neither for nor against a
merger. 149 Procter & Gamble remains, by virtue of inertia, the
official position in Supreme Court jurisprudence, although the Court
has not decided a merger case since 1976 and it is doubtful that it
would follow that position today. 150
On the European side, something similar may have happened in
GE/Honeywell. The Commission’s portfolio effects theory depended
on a prediction that the combination of the resources of GE’s various
divisions, including GE Capital and GE’s engine divisions, with
Honeywell’s avionics products would allow the merged firms to
charge lower prices to their consumers and hence distort the level
playing field. 151 Although Mario Monti—the EC’s Competition
Commissioner-denied that the portfolio effects theory was a rejection
of an efficiency defense, 152 it is hard to understand the argument as
anything other.
The specific theories invoked, such as the
145

Brown Shoe Co. v. U.S., 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962).
60 F.T.C. 944 (1962), modified, 67 F.T.C. 282 (1965).
147
Id. at 1083-84.
148
Id. at 1084.
149
FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967) (“Possible economies
cannot be used as a defense to illegality. Congress was aware that some mergers
which lessen competition may also result in economies but it struck the balance in
favor of protecting competition.”).
150
See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra n. xxx ¶ 970c1 at 31 (“The Court’s brief and
unelaborated language cannot reasonably be taken as a definitive disposition of so
important and complex an issue as the proper role of economies in analyzing the
legality of a merger.”).
151
See Eleanor M. Fox, GE/Honeywell: The U.S. Merger that Europe Stopped—A
Story of the Politics of Convergence, in ANTITRUST STORIES (Eleanor M. Fox &
Daniel A. Crane, eds, 2007).
152
Id. at 344.
146
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elimination of double marginalization through bundling and
leveraging the ability to extend credit across larger commercial
enterprises, are precisely the kinds of efficiency defenses often raised
in vertical and horizontal cases. The Commission also appeared to
hold efficiencies against the merger in two earlier cases,
Areospatiale/Havilland and Boeing/McDonnell Douglas, 153 and in a
more recent case, Vodafone AirTouch/Mannesmann. 154
Assuming for the sake of argument that merger efficiencies
sometimes destabilize competition and create market dominance, this
is not a reason for undifferentiated hostility to merger efficiencies.
Even if some merger efficiencies harm competition, this is surely a
minority of all merger cases. The merging firms may be merging
simply to catch up with other firms that have already achieved
particular efficiencies. Or, other non-merging firms have alternative
paths for matching efficiencies generated by the merging parties and
a new incentive to do so.
Moreover, the claim that efficiencies will likely occur and that,
in the long run, they will destabilize competition to the detriment of
consumers, is necessarily more speculative on average than a merger
efficiencies defense since it relies on proof not only that efficiencies
will occur but that they will subsequently destabilize competition. It
makes no sense to hold defendants to a high standard of proof that
pro-competitive efficiencies will result and simultaneously hold the
government to a low burden of proof that anti-competitive
efficiencies will result. What’s sauce for the goose is sauce for the
gander.
F. Status Quo Preference
Another cluster of possible reasons for a principle of asymmetry
relates to a general preference for the status quo over change. The
relevant phenomena could be grouped under a number of different
headings, including risk aversion, endowment effect, loss aversion,
status quo bias, and a precautionary principle. For simplicity, I
consider them under the headings loss aversion and the precautionary
principle.
153

Pitofsky, Efficiency Consideration, supra n. xxx at 1423-24.
Philip J. Weiser, Reexamining the Legacy of Dual Regulation: Reforming Dual
Merger Review by the DoJ and FTC, 61 Fed. Comm. L. J. 167, 188 (2008).
154
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1. Loss Aversion
Antitrust regulators may react asymmetrically to potential losses
and gains. It is well established in behavioral theory that decision
makers, including regulators, sometimes weight potential losses more
than potential gains of an equivalent magnitude. 155 If regulators
consider the competitive status quo the relevant baseline, then
anticompetitive effects may count as losses whereas merger-specific
efficiencies may count as gains. This would then explain the
asymmetry principle—that efficiencies must be more certain than
harms in order to offset the harms.
A more particular explanation for asymmetry concerns the
political consequences of prohibiting or approving a merger. An
antitrust enforcement agency will face blame for price increases
resulting from a merger but rarely for price decreases that did not
occur because a merger was wrongly blocked. 156 Hence, the
agencies have a greater incentive to block mergers that might result
in gains to consumers than to approve mergers that might result in
losses to consumers.
While loss aversion may explain the asymmetry principle’s
existence, it cannot justify the principle normatively. Even assuming
that consumer loss aversion is normatively neutral, 157 regulatory loss
aversion is categorically undesirable unless it channels the
preferences of political constituents in a democratically legitimate
way. There is no good reason to think that consumers, as a class,
would exhibit loss aversion as to merger decisions as a class. To be
sure, the consumers affected by a particular merger—say one
involving dog food—might exhibit loss aversion as to that particular
155

See, e.g., Roger G. Noll & James E. Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive
Psychology for Risk Regulation, 19 J. Legal Stud. 747 (1990).
156
For example, commentators have blamed high oil prices on lax merger
enforcement in the oil industry. See Public Citizen, Mergers, Manipulation, and
Mirages: How Oil Companies Keep Gasoline Prices High, and Why the Energy
Bill Doesn't Help 1 (2004), http://www.citizen.org/documents/oilmergers.pdf (“The
United States has allowed multiple large, vertically integrated oil companies to
merge over the last five years, placing control of the market in too few hands. The
result: uncompetitive domestic gasoline markets.”).
157
See Matthew D. Adler, Welfare Polls: A Synthesis, 81 NYU L. Rev. 1875, 1917
(2006) (describing loss aversion as “a kind of preference distortion”);
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merger. But consumers who buy dog good also buy toothpaste, DVD
players, and life insurance, all of which industries are also subject to
merger policy. As to the class of merger activities, they are
diversified and therefore should prefer a strategy that maximizes their
overall wellbeing, even if it leads to occasional price increases. 158
Regulatory loss aversion in the merger context seems merely to
reflect the self-preservationist biases of regulators.
2. Precautionary Principle
Another source of status quo bias or preference may derive from
more general theories of cost-benefit analysis. Cass Sunstein has
identified a “precautionary principle” at work in almost every legal
Under the precautionary principle, when a new
system. 159
behavior—such as the introduction of a new drug—creates a risk of
harm, the proponents of the new behavior bear a heavy burden of
disproving the likelihood of harm before the change should be
allowed. Thus, for example, if a new drug might cause cancer as a
side effect, it should be kept off the market until the issue is fully
studied and the cancer risk ruled out. Merger harms may thus be
given more weight than merger efficiencies because the merging
parties—the proponents of change—bear the burden of ruling out the
possibility that their activity will lead to harm.
As Sunstein notes, however, this principle can be “literally
paralyzing” because it prohibits both action and inaction. 160 For
example, suppose that the drug creates a 10% risk that 100 people
will die but a 10% probability that 100 people will be saved.
Allowing the new drug risks killing 100 people but disallowing the
new drug also risks killing 100 people. What is called for in such a
situation is not an application some a priori principle about avoiding
risks but rather a cost-benefit analysis given the relative probabilities
and magnitudes of the respective risks of action and inaction.

158

See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Are American CEOs Overpaid, and, if so, What
Should be Done About It?, 58 Duke L. J. 1013, 1037 (2009) (discussing
relationship between loss aversion and diversification).
159
Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1003
(2003).
160
Id. at 1003.
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Nonetheless, there may be circumstances when some version of
the precautionary principle carries weight. The first strain involves
changes—such as pollution leading to global warming or
deregulation of nuclear facilities—that entail an uncertain probability
of irreversible catastrophic consequences. 161 The second involves
changes with uncertain, and potentially unjust, distributive
consequences. 162 Neither of these strains of precautionary principle
theory provides support for a principle of asymmetry in merger
review.
The irremediable catastrophic event strain of the precautionary
principle has no application to mergers. Merger policy involves
calculations of risk—bounded predictions—rather than complete
uncertainty. 163 The consequences of anticompetitive mergers, even if
undesirable, are hardly ever catastrophic. Most significantly,
mergers are not irremediable. It is possible (although difficult) to
force parties to unwind an anticompetitive merger if they begin to
exercise anticompetitive power because of the merger. 164
If anything, the option to unwind mergers that turn out to be
anticompetitive suggests that efficiencies should be given more
weight than theories of harm. Once a merger is blocked, there is
virtually no chance that the merger will be allowed at some future
point. This is for two reasons. First, given the time-sensitivity of
most mergers, deals that are not consummated quickly are usually
never consummated. 165 Second, once an agency or court has blocked
a merger for antitrust reasons, subsequent events will not usually
provide it an occasion to rethink its position and allow the merger to
transpire. If the market remains essentially static, then there will
161

Cass R.. Sunstein, Irreversibility, 9 Law, Probability & Risk 227, 235-36
(2010); Cass R. Sunstein, The Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle, Issues
in Legal Scholarship, Catastrophic Risks: Prevention, Compensation, and Recovery
(2007): Article 3, available at [ ]http:// www.bepress.com/ils/iss10/art3.; Cass R.
Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 841 (2006).
162
See, e.g., Stephen M. Gardiner, A Core Precautionary Principle, 14 J. Pol. Phil.
33 (2006).
163
Peter L. Bernstein, Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story of Risk 133, 219
(1996) (discussing the distinction between and explaining that “uncertainty means
unknown probabilities,” while risk is measurable).
164
See, e.g., HMG § 2.1.1 (discussing evidence that might support unwinding of
consummated merger).
165
See supra text accompanying notes xxx –xxx.
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usually be little reason to make a different prediction about
competitive effects a few years after the initial decision. If the
market changes considerably, for example because of entry or exit of
firms, significant changes in consumer demand, or the introduction of
new technologies, the merger review calculus of the agencies
changes but so does the merger calculus of the parties. One finds
very few examples of mergers initially prohibited but then allowed a
few years later.
The upshot is that the option value of disallowing a merger after
consummation is greater than the option value of allowing a merger
after initial prohibition. Even if the option value of unwinding a
merger is small given the costs to the agencies and parties, given that
the option value of allowing a merger in the future is close to zero,
option theory cuts in favor of either neutrality between harms and
efficiencies or a slight preference for efficiencies.
The other argument sometimes made in support of some version
of the precautionary principle is that because changes in social or
economic structures—such as mergers—have distributive
consequences, regulatory decision-makers need to rule out the
possibility that the distributive changes will be unjust. 166 But that
argument has little to do with merger policy, since regulatory
decision-makers generally lack good information on the distribution
of gains and losses from mergers as between classes of consumers. 167
They do know something about the predictive distribution of gains
and losses as between producers and consumers—and in consumer
welfare jurisdictions at least insist the net consumer position be
predicatively positive. But this is very different from being able to
predict that a merger will lead to a welfare gain for old people and a
welfare loss for poorer people, or other such trade-offs within the
consumer class that might be expected in other regulatory contexts,
such as those dealing with the side-effects of drug therapies or
changes in workplace safety rules.
The same is true of mergers. It makes no sense to give more
weight to merger risks than to benefits of equal probability and
magnitude. The risks and benefits simply need to be weighed given
166

See, e.g., Stephen M. Gardiner, A Core Precautionary Principle, 14 J. Pol. Phil.
33 (2006).
167
Daniel A. Crane, Technocracy and Antitrust, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 1159, 1213-14
(2008).
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the best available evidence about their relative probabilities and
magnitudes.

G. Deconcentration as a Political Value
A final potential reason for discriminatory treatment of risks and
efficiencies relates to what Bob Pitosfky has referred to as antitrust’s
“political content.” 168 Perhaps mergers that increase concentration to
certain thresholds should be barred for political or social reasons,
even if there are efficiencies sufficient to offset any harms to
consumers.
The “political content” argument could come in two different
very different flavors, and distinguishing between them is essential to
testing the soundness of the proposition. One version of the
argument—consistent with the mid-twentieth century U.S.
Congressional concern with a “rising tide of concentration” in the
American economy 169—would worry about the overall level of
concentrated economic power in the private sector. The other
version would be concerned about aggregations of market power in
specific, culturally or politically sensitive industries.
The “rising tide” argument depends on an empirical observation
that a particular nation’s economy has reached a concentration
danger zone that justifies condemning mergers of a certain threshold,
even if those mergers are justified by consumer-friendly efficiencies.
It is far from true that such a case could be made today, certainly at
least for the American economy. To take one snapshot, in 1980 the
U.S. economy had 2.7 million corporations, 1.4 million partnerships,

168

Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1051
(1979).
169
U.S. v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 276 (1966) (“’The dominant theme
pervading congressional consideration of the 1950 amendments was a fear of what
was considered to be a rising tide of economic concentration in the American
economy.’ To arrest this ‘rising tide toward concentration into too few hands and to
halt the gradual demise of the small businessman, Congress decided to clamp down
with vigor on mergers.”) (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294,
315 (1962)).
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and 9.7 million non-farm sole proprietorships. 170 Two decades later,
after a period generally thought to have been characterized by lax
merger enforcement, the economy had 5.5 million corporations, 2.0
million partnerships, and 17.7 million non-farm sole
proprietorships. 171 The top 1,000 firms accounted for a smaller share
of GDP than fifty years earlier.
Further, even if one were to find “rising tide” arguments
generally appealing, there is an instrumental mismatch between a
deconcentration policy objective and hostility to efficiencies
defenses. Many gargantuan corporate mergers raise few antitrust
concerns because the merging firms have few or no competitive
overlaps or because they occur in relatively unconcentrated markets.
Such mergers contribute far more to an increasing consolidation of
economic power in the economy as a whole than do many mergers of
small companies that attract antitrust attention because they occur in
concentrated markets.
The second argument, that aggregations of market power in
culturally or politically sensitive industries may be undesirable even
if those aggregations result in efficiencies, is also not a general
justification for an asymmetrical approach to merger costs and
benefits. Assuming that political or social considerations sometimes
count in favor of blocking a merger, such values should not be
concealed in an implicit hostility to efficiencies. Instead, they should
be affirmatively expressed and weighed against other values in the
context of merger review in limited set of cases to which they apply.
Suppose, for example, that a large media merger increases
concentration to levels that raise competitive concerns or achieves
vertical integration that could potentially be used to block
competitors from access to essential inputs. Suppose that the merger
would also generate large efficiencies that would be passed on to
consumers. Further suppose that there is a legitimate concern that
concentrating too much power over news or entertainment in single
managerial hands would lead to cultural or political hegemony—
concerns that were raised with respect to AOL’s merger with Time

170

Lawrence J. White, What’s Been Happening to Aggregate Concentration in the
United
States
(And
Should
We
Care?),
http://www.stern.nyu.edu/eco/wkpapers/workingpapers02/02-03White.pdf.
171
Id.
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Warner 172 and Comcast’s acquisition of NBC. 173 Step one in the
analysis should require weighing the anticompetitive risks to
consumers against the efficiencies, using an equal probability burden.
At a second stage in the analysis, the separate political or social
concerns should be raised and addressed in a transparent and open
way.
To be sure, different values—such as consumer welfare and
avoidance of cultural hegemony—are often difficult to compare
because they are incommensurate. But that is all the more reason to
raise and explore each value separately, as opposed to burying one
value in an implicit reluctance to recognize another.
IV. RE-VALUING MERGER EFFICIENCIES
The preceding section questioned the possible justifications for
asymmetrical treatment of merger costs and efficiencies. Since none
of those justifications is sufficient to justify asymmetrical treatment,
ordinary principles of cost-benefit analysis should apply to merger
review. In particular, the predicted costs of mergers from the postmerger exercise of market power presumptively should be equally
weighted with the predicted efficiencies of mergers with an equal
present value. 174
In order to operationalize a symmetrical approach, attention
needs to be paid to three implementation issues. The first concerns
the relationship between the standard of proof and the burden of
proof. The second concerns questions of commensurability and
172

Frank Rich, Two 21st Century Foxes Elope, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 2000, at A17
(“If you believe that the Internet is the greatest explosion of free expression and
cultural resources of the past century, what happens when it is merchandised as a
mass-market product by the biggest corporations in history?”).
173
Gautham Nagesh, Lawmakers Divided Over Whether NBC-Comcast Merger
Would Aid Diversity, http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/126051nbc-comcast-merger-divides-lawmakers-on-diversity-.
174
The present value qualifier is necessary to highlight the fact that some
efficiencies may not materialize for several years. For example, if two merging
firms plan to close their existing inefficient plans and open a single new and more
efficient plant within three years following the merger (but only if they are able to
merge—making the new plant a merger-specific efficiency), the future efficiencies
resulting from the merger should be discounted to reflect the fact that the possible
anticompetitive harms could begin immediately following consummation of the
merger.

https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/art30

46

FORTHCOMING 110 MICH. L. REV. (2011)

3/4/2011 11:29 AM

Crane:

48

balancing. The third concerns the increased costs that would arise
from injecting greater complexity into merger review.
A. Standards of Proof and Burdens of Proof
This paper calls for a symmetrical standard of proof for merger
efficiencies and predicted anticompetitive effects. That does not
mean, however, that the government should be required to disprove
possible efficiencies as part of its evaluation of the case. The
weighting of costs and benefits is a separate question from the
allocation of the burden of proof. As a general matter, burdens of
proof should be allocated to the party who can obtain the relevant
information at the lower cost. 175 In a merger cases, the information
validating efficiency claims is often uniquely in the possession of the
merging parties, and it therefore makes sense that the merging parties
should bear the burden of sustaining efficiencies claims. Conversely,
the government will ordinarily bear the burden of establishing
predictive anticompetitive effects.
If the government and merging parties are held to the same
standard of proof—preponderance of the evidence, for example—
then, conceptually, harms and efficiencies will be given equal weight
despite the different allocations of burdens of proof. This does not
mean, however, that the merging parties will find it as easy to prove
efficiencies as the government will to prove harms. It may be the
case that certain classes of efficiencies are difficult to demonstrate
even to fairly low thresholds of proof on a case-specific basis, even
though there is a high degree of probability that they frequently
appear in mergers. 176
If probabilities of harm are easier to demonstrate on an
individualized basis than probabilities of efficiencies, even though in
the aggregate both harms and efficiencies are similarly likely in the
relevant categories of cases, then merger policy will display a bias in
favor of theories of harm even if it adopts an explicit symmetry
principle. If so, then some systematic adjustment toward leniency, of
the type advocated by Fisher and Lande, might still be justified.177
However, the first-order preference should be to treat harms and
benefits symmetrically on an individualized basis and only make a
175

CHRISTOPHER MUELLER & LAIRD KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE (2003).
See Fisher & Lande, supra n. xxx.
177
See supra text accompany notes xxx – xxx.
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systematic correction to the extent necessary in light of the system’s
actual experience with a principle of symmetry.
B. Balancing and Problems of Commensurability
Many commentators assert—along with the Merger Guidelines—
that the interplay between predictions of harm and predictions of
efficiencies cannot come down to “balancing.” 178 The influential
Areda-Hovenkamp treatise argues: “’Balancing’ implies an ability to
assign a common unit of measurement to the two things being
balanced, and determine which outweighs the other. Except in the
clearest cases, this is simply not what courts are capable of doing.” 179
Indeed, it is often difficult to assign specific weights to
anticompetitive effects and offsetting efficiencies given (a)
uncertainty in the robustness of methodological tools, (b) data
limitations with respect to future events, and (c) the likely timing in
which anticompetitive effects or efficiencies may take effect and
their subsequent duration. Small predictive differences generated by
imprecise methodological tools and imperfect data make large
differences in assigning probability-adjusted values. In most cases, it
will be impossible to apply the suggested formula—assign equal
weight to probability-adjusted net present values—mathematically
and therefore to engage in anything approaching rigorous
balancing. 180 The “40% probability of a $100 loss or gain”
hypothetical presented in the introduction is just that—a hypothetical.
But the failure of commensurability is not a reason to abandon
symmetrical treatment as an analytical principle. Rather, it is a reason
to use the principle of symmetrical treatment as a policy mnemonic
device, much as we already use mathematically indeterminate
concepts like probable cause and reasonable suspicion to capture
probability values around identified legal decisions. At present, the
178

IV AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra n. xxx ¶976c, at 103-04; Conrath & Widnell,
supra n. xxx at 686 (arguing that “[t]he difficult challenge presented by such an
efficiencies defense is whether there is a coherent way to balance the potential
anticompetitive effects against its potential efficiency benefits”); Reckens, supra n.
xxx at 179 (arguing that balancing of efficiencies and theories of harm can only
take place under a total welfare effects framework).
179
See IV AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra n. xxx ¶976c, at 103-04.
180
But see Coate, supra n. xxx at 206-07 (arguing that econometric tools have
sufficiently developed to permit calculations of net effects of efficiencies and
increases in market power to be computed in some cases).
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U.S. merger guidelines contain a mnemonic device of asymmetry—
“the Agencies will not simply compare the magnitude of the cognizable
efficiencies with the magnitude of the likely harm to competition absent the
efficiencies.” 181 They do not pretend that merger review involves precise
computations of the probabilities of harms and benefits and a specified
discount—say 20%–on the probability adjusted net present value of
expected efficiencies before efficiencies are balanced against harms. If the
mnemonic device of asymmetry is insupportable, as argued in this paper,
then the proper response is to implement a mnemonic device of symmetry.
Changing verbal formulations in merger guidelines or case law is, of
course, not enough to effectuate meaningful change in agency or judicial
practice. The real point is that agencies and courts should be asked to think
about merger efficiencies (at least those likely to be passed on to
consumers) and predicted harms as concepts with equal prima facie dignity.
By various institutional, legal, political, and administrative mechanisms,
merger efficiencies have been deflated. They deserve a more hospitable
welcome.

C. Costs of Increased Complexity
The final consideration concerns the enhanced costs of revaluing
merger efficiencies. Commentators, particularly Fisher and Lande,
have argued against individualized efficiencies defenses on the
grounds that they increase both transaction costs—to parties,
agencies, and courts—and uncertainty costs, since predicting whether
a court or agency will accept an efficiencies argument is difficult. 182
To be sure, an explicit or implicit revaluation of merger
efficiencies will induce parties to spend more time presenting
efficiencies arguments and require courts and agencies to spend more
time considering them. That in itself is not a sufficient objection
unless the marginal social benefit of a more fine-tuned merger review
system is less than the marginal cost of processing more information.
Two observations suggest that the costs of individualized efficiencies
review are not great given the status quo.
First, Fisher and Lande presented a choice between no
individualized consideration of efficiencies and symmetrical

181
182

HMG § 10.
Fisher &Lande, supra n. xxx at 1677.
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treatment of efficiencies and harms. 183 In fact, both the U.S. and the
EU currently allow parties to make efficiencies arguments. As noted
earlier, the FTC study shows that parties usually do and that the staff
responds to them. 184 Neither the agencies nor the parties spend as
much time on efficiencies arguments as they would if a symmetry
principle were adopted so there would be some marginal cost to
putting a greater weight on efficiencies. But the marginal cost need
not be large, given that much of the information is already collected
and disseminated.
Second, it is doubtful that a greater receptivity to efficiencies
claims would substantially increase the unpredictability of merger
decisions in the agencies. Fisher and Lande expressed their concern
over unpredictability costs at a time when merger review was far
more predictable than it is today. Structural presumptions, such as
four firm ratio tests and the HHI, still dominated merger analysis. 185
Over the last three decades, antitrust analysis has progressively deemphasized structural factors, moved toward more sophisticated
econometric tools, and increasingly emphasized anticompetitive
effects in differentiated goods and services markets. 186 As the 2010
Horizontal Merger Guidelines explain, the “Guidelines should be
read with the awareness that merger analysis does not consist of
uniform application of a single methodology. Rather, it is a factspecific process through which the Agencies, guided by their
extensive experience, apply a range of analytical tools to the
reasonably available and reliable evidence to evaluate competitive
concerns in a limited period of time.” 187 The analysis has become far
more nuanced and technical—and therefore less predictable.
Lawyers can no longer offer their clients clean predictions in many
potentially close cases.
The fact that merger analysis has become less predictable is not a
reason to pile on additional and unnecessary unpredictability. But

183

Id.
Supra n. xxx.
185
Deborah A. Garza, Market Definition, the New Horizontal Merger Guidelines,
and the Long March Away from Structural Presumptions, 10-OCT-Antitrust
Source 1, 2 (2010) (explaining importance of structural presumptions in 1968 and
1982 Horizontal Merger Guidelines).
186
See supra text accompanying notes xxx – xxx.
187
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given that merger review teams—both at the parties and at the
agencies—already require the involvement of economists and
industry experts in close cases and that these teams already consider
efficiencies to some extent, relatively little marginal cost or
unpredictability would be added by directing these teams to take
efficiencies more seriously.

CONCLUSION
Merger policy has long been dominated by a focus on only one
side of the ledger—anticompetitive effects. The reasons offered for
ignoring the other side of the ledger are weak and often
contradictory. A principle of symmetrical treatment of predicted
harms and efficiencies would improve merger policy, without
necessarily liberalizing it in undesirable ways.
For cultural and institutional reasons, the U.S. and EU are
relatively unlikely explicitly to recognize a symmetry principle in the
near future. Both jurisdictions have already had to overcome a view
that efficiencies should count against mergers. Even conceding that
efficiencies should play some small role in merger analysis was a big
step. The U.S. and EU are unlikely to take the final step to a
symmetry principle any time soon—particularly given the
maintenance of principles of symmetry in recent merger guidelines
revisions.
But the evolution of norms on the ground often precedes the
evolution of norms on the books. Particularly as the agencies move
away from structural presumptions and focus their attention on
unilateral anticompetitive effects theories in differentiated markets,
there is an opportunity for greater attention to efficiencies that may
offset competitive concerns.
And then there is the rest of the world. At present, at least 86
jurisdictions have premerger notification regimes, many of them
instituted in the last few years. 188 In many developing countries,
economic growth (as opposed to short-run consumer welfare) ranks
high among the priorities for the antitrust regime. Merger-generated
efficiencies may receive a more cordial reception in jurisdictions

188

Fox & Crane, supra n. xxx at 302.
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eager to stimulate industrial development. The symmetry principle
may first take root outside the traditional antitrust regimes.
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